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This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to 
provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to violate their 
commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-
member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, 
coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion 
that stable coalitions are larger, and provide more of a public good, when their members 
are responsible for financing enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that 
member-financed enforcement of compliance reduces the provision of the public good. 
The decrease is attributed to an increase in the participation threshold for a stable 
coalition to form and to significant levels of noncompliance. Provision of the public good 
increases significantly when we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all 











The analysis of stable coalitions is important in many contexts including the formation of 
cartels (D’Aspremont et al., 1983; Diamantoudi, 2005), international environmental 
agreements (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994; Kolstad, 2007), voluntary 
agreements with industries (Dawson and Segerson, 2008), the provision of threshold 
public goods (Van de Kragt, 1983; Dawes et al., 1986; Marks and Croson, 1998) and 
industry mergers (Vasconcelos, 2006). Although many definitions of coalitional stability 
exist, the concept initially proposed by D’Aspremont et al. (1983) is frequently adopted. 
According to D’Aspremont et al. (1983), a coalition is considered stable if no existing 
member wishes to leave (internal stability) and no non-member wishes to join (external 
stability). With identical agents, these two conditions ensure that a stable coalition is 
unique in size, consisting of the minimum number of members such that each are better 
off than in the absence of any cooperation. In other words, a stable coalition is the 
minimum sized profitable coalition. Most economic analyses of these types of coalitions 
are concerned primarily with individual agents’ incentives to participate in, or defect 
from, a group of cooperating members. As a result, the term ‘stable’ is somewhat 
narrow as it refers exclusively to defining the number of members in a coalition, not with 
their decisions to cooperate after joining. 
 
Without enforcement, however, individuals may first join a coalition to make certain that 
it satisfies a minimum membership requirement for formation, and then later renege on 
their commitments in an attempt to free ride off those members that continue to 
cooperate. For example, nations may become party to an international environmental 
agreement (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) with the sole intention of satisfying a minimum 
membership requirement so that an agreement can enter into force. Later, if compliance 
is not adequately enforced, nations may find it in their interest to violate the terms of the 
agreement. In general, inadequate enforcement within coalitions can undermine the 
objectives of cooperative agreements and even prevent them from forming at all. 
 
Despite the fact that the commitments of coalition members need to be enforced, little 
attention has been paid to this problem. In fact, most authors who examine stable 
coalitions simply assume that their members will comply fully with the terms of a 
cooperative agreement (e.g. D’Aspremont et al., 1983; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; 
Barrett, 1994; Kolstad, 2007; Dawson and Segerson, 2008). In contrast, this study 
evaluates the performance of coalitions in which all members have the opportunity to 
violate their commitments and, consequently, to fund a third-party enforcer to maintain 
compliance. Our study consists of a theoretical analysis of the impact of member-
financed enforcement on the size of stable coalitions and their provision of a public 
good, as well as laboratory experiments to test the main hypotheses of the theoretical 
model. 
 
Our theoretical model suggests that member-financed enforcement of compliance within 
coalitions can lead to greater participation and greater provision of a public good than 
when compliance is assured without cost. This is intuitive because more cooperation is 
necessary to offset the additional costs of enforcement to make a coalition profitable. To 
test this theoretical result we conducted a series of experiments that utilize a threshold 
public good framework similar to those of Van de Kragt et al. (1983), Dawes et al. 
(1986), Bagnoli and McKee (1991), and Marks and Croson (1999), but with the added 
compliance and enforcement dimensions. However, our experimental results flatly reject 
the hypothesis that member-financed enforcement within stable coalitions leads to 
greater provision of a public good. Relative to the theoretical predictions, as well as to 
baseline experiments that did not allow subjects the opportunity to be noncompliant, 
requiring member-financed enforcement actually decreased the average provision of 
the public good. 
 
Our experimental design allows us to explain the poor performance of stable coalitions 
with member-financed enforcement in terms of the two factors that change when giving 
coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to 
finance an enforcer to maintain compliance. The first is the compliance decision itself 
and the second is the theoretical outcome that the individual cost of financing 
enforcement leads to a higher participation threshold if coalitions with member-financed 
enforcement are to form. We demonstrate that both factors contributed to the poor 
showing of stable coalitions with member-financed enforcement. Like other authors 
(Van de Kragt et al., 1983; Dawes et al., 1986; Suleimen and Rapoport, 1992; Rapoport 
and Suleiman, 1993; Cadsby and Maynes, 1999) we find that increasing the 
participation threshold lowered the average provision of a public good because 
coalitions formed less frequently. Moreover, even though we structured the compliance 
incentives so that each member of a coalition had the financial motivation to comply, a 
significant number did not. 
 
Because theoretically stable coalitions with member-financed enforcement performed 
so poorly, we conducted another set of experiments with which we abandoned the 
restrictive internal and external stability requirements of stable coalitions and examined 
the performance of a coalition that was costly to enforce, but required full participation to 
form. This requirement did not change average compliance rates within coalitions, but it 
significantly increased both the frequency of coalition formation and the overall provision 
of the public good. Our results suggest important lessons for the determination of 
threshold rules for coalition formation and for enforcing compliance within coalitions. 
Improving coalition formation and compliance within coalitions requires a higher 
participation threshold, perhaps full participation, and more stringent enforcement than 
suggested by theory. 
 
2. Stable coalitions to provide a public good 
 
In this section we present a model of the formation of coalitions to provide a public good 
that form the basis for our experiments. In particular we derive equilibrium levels of 
participation in these coalitions when they require member-financed enforcement and 
when they do not. Comparing these participation levels provides the main hypothesis of 
this paper: member-financed enforcement of compliance within stable coalitions leads 
to greater participation than when compliance is assured without cost. Since our 
theoretical development and experiments have individuals deciding whether to provide 
a single unit of a public good, increased participation in coalitions also implies increased 
provision of the good. 
 
2.1 Stable coalitions without the need for costly enforcement 
 
Consider n homogeneous players with payoff functions 
 
(1)     
 
where qi is equal to one if player i contributes to the public good and is zero if she does 
not, q-i is the sum of the contributions by all other players, b is the constant marginal 
benefit of public good contributions, c is the cost of contributing to the public good, and 
A is a positive constant. The structure of the players’ interactions is an n-player 
prisoners’ dilemma, requiring b<c and nb > c. That is, all players have a dominant 
strategy to not contribute to the public good in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, but 
their joint payoffs will be maximized when they all contribute. Thus, the players have an 
incentive to form a cooperative agreement to provide the good. 
 
Suppose at first that compliance with such an agreement is assured without cost. 
Following Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007), we model coalition formation as a two-stage 
game. In the first stage, each player decides whether or not to join a coalition to provide 
the public good. We deviate slightly from the coalition models of Ulph and Kolstad by 
having each player make this decision sequentially. When a player makes a choice 
whether or not to join a coalition, she knows all of the choices of those who decided 
before her. This type of sequential decision-making better represents the participation 
process in many voluntary coalitions (e.g., international environmental agreements). We 
will demonstrate shortly that this feature does not change the equilibrium coalition 
structure from the traditional simultaneous decision games. 
 
In the second stage, all players decide whether to contribute their unit of the good. The 
players that do not join the coalition in the first stage maximize their individual payoffs 
by not contributing to the public good in the second. Those that do join in the first stage 
commit to decisions in the second stage that maximize the joint payoffs of the coalition 
members, given that the non-members will not contribute. 
 
The members of a coalition commit to contributing to the public good in the second 
stage as long as each of them is at least as well off with all members contributing as 
they would be if no player contributed to the public good. That is, a coalition must be 
profitable for its members. Let s denote the number of members of a coalition who all 
agree to contribute to the public good; let  denote the payoff of each of the 
coalition members if they decide to contribute to the public good, and let  denote 
the payoff of each of the non-members. (The superscript m signals that the player in 
question is a member of the coalition, while the superscript nm signals that the player is 
not a member of the coalition). From (1), the payoff functions for each coalition member 
and for each non-member are: 
 
(2)     
 
Since b < c, nb > c, and  is increasing in s, there exist coalition sizes that are 
strictly greater than one and weakly less than n that are profitable. The smallest of these 
profitable coalitions is 
 
(3)     
 
Throughout, the superscript nc denotes values when the decisions of the coalition 
members do not require costly enforcement. If the number of joiners in the first stage of 
the game is greater than or equal to s^nc, they will agree that each of them will 
contribute to the public good in the second stage. If the number of joiners in the first 
stage is less than snc, they will agree to not contribute to the public good in the second 
stage because it would be unprofitable to do so. 
 
The equilibrium coalition size in this game is called a self-enforcing coalition in the 
theoretical literature on cartels and international environmental agreements (e.g., 
D’Aspremont et al., 1983; Barrett, 1994). At the self-enforcing coalition size no member 
of the coalition wants to leave the coalition (the coalition is internally stable) and no non-
member wants to join the coalition (the coalition is externally stable). The only internally 
and externally stable coalition size is the smallest profitable coalition, snc: To see why, 
note that for a coalition size s>snc any member could leave the coalition and the 
remaining members would still find it profitable to contribute to the public good. Using 
the payoff functions (2), the defector’s payoff would be 
which is greater than its payoff if it stayed in the coalition,  by the 
amount c – b > 0: Since individuals are motivated to leave a coalition of any size s > 
s^nc, these coalitions are not internally stable. On the other hand, a coalition of size s = 
s^nc is internally stable, because if one member leaves the coalition it is no longer 
profitable for the remaining members to contribute to the public good. Since no 
individual would provide the public good in this case, a defector’s payoff would simply 
be  which is weakly less than its payoff if it stayed in the coalition, 
. Finally, a coalition with s^nc members is externally stable 
because no non-member would want to join. To see why calculate
 = b - c < 0, which indicates that an individual who joins the 
smallest profitable coalition is worse off than staying out of the coalition. 
 
Demonstrating that s^nc is the self-enforcing coalition size is normally accomplished 
under the assumption that players make their decisions to join or not join a coalition 
simultaneously. We now demonstrate that the subgame-perfect equilibrium in a 
sequential decision making game is the self-enforcing coalition size, because, in our 
experiments, the order in which subjects make their participation decisions is 
endogenous. That is, players decide when, relative to others, to join or not join a 
coalition. Given identical players we cannot predict the order in which each player will 
move. Therefore, we assume that the order of players’ decisions in this game is 
determined randomly by nature. Given the order of moves, we are able to predict the 
order of join/not join decisions. 
 
Define a ‘critical’ player as one that is required to join a coalition if that coalition is to 
meet the profitability requirement (3). Thus, a player is critical if and only if n – s^nc 
players have already opted out of the coalition. Moreover, a critical player would always 
prefer to join a coalition, because not joining would prevent a profitable coalition from 
forming and all players prefer to be part of a profitable coalition than have no coalition 
form at all (i.e.,  (0)). Since all critical players will join a coalition, a 
noncritical player would never join, because it is always more profitable to stay out of a 
profitable coalition (i.e.,  from (2)). Therefore, in equilibrium there 
will be snc coalition members and n – s^nc non-members. Since non-members earn 
strictly higher payoffs than members, the first n – s^nc players to choose will decide to 
opt out of the coalition, and the last s^nc players to decide will join. In the second stage 
of the game, all members of the coalition make their contributions to the public good, 
while the remaining players contribute nothing. 
 
2.2 Stable coalitions with member-financed enforcement 
 
We now give coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitment to provide 
the public good. To counteract this, coalition members fund an independent enforcer 
who monitors the behavior of coalition members and applies a sanction when one is 
found not contributing to the public good. Following McEvoy and Stranlund (2009), this 
game is played in four stages. In the first stage, players decide sequentially whether to 
join a cooperative coalition. In the second stage, members of the coalition jointly agree 
on whether to contribute to the public good. If they do agree to contribute to the public 
good, each member is required to contribute funds to the independent enforcer. If the 
coalition members decide not to contribute to the public good in stage 2, they do not 
fund the enforcer and the game ends with no contributions to the public good. If the 
coalition members agree to contribute to the public good in stage 2, they move onto 
stage 3 in which all players make their contribution decisions independently. Finally, in 
stage 4 the enforcer randomly audits the coalition members and applies a sanction 
when a member is found not contributing to the public good. Because the game is 
solved by backward induction we begin by describing the last stage. 
 
2.2.1 Enforcement stage If the game reaches this stage, a coalition of s members has 
formed, each member has agreed to contribute to the public good, each member has 
provided x dollars to fund the enforcer, and all players have made their contributions. In 
this stage, the enforcer randomly audits the decisions of the coalition members with a 
probability that is an increasing function of the amount of funding the members provide. 
Each additional dollar of funding allows the number of random audits to increase by 
_>0. Thus, if s coalition members each provide x to fund the enforcer, then the number 
of random audits conducted is sx_ and the probability that any member is audited is 
 
(4)     
 
A member that is revealed to be noncompliant by the enforcer incurs a known 
exogenous sanction of f. 
 
2.2.2 Contributions stage At this point in the game the coalition members have agreed 
to contribute to the public good and have funded the enforcer. In this stage both 
coalition members and non-members independently choose whether to contribute to the 
public good. All non-members will chose to not contribute, but coalition members make 
this decision by comparing the expected cost of not complying with their agreement and 
the benefit of noncompliance. 
 
Assume that the coalition members are risk neutral and that they comply if they are at 
least indifferent between compliance and noncompliance. Then, given a coalition of s 
members, in the contributions stage an individual member will comply if its expected 
payoff from doing so is not less than its expected payoff from noncompliance. Given the 
probability of an audit p and the sanction f, a compliant coalition member’s payoff is 
, while a noncompliant member’s expected payoff is , 
where  and  are defined by (2). Since the individuals are identical and 
coalition members face the same enforcement parameters, all members either comply 
or all do not. Therefore, each coalition member complies with the terms of the 
agreement if and only if 
 
(5)    
 
that is, each coalition member complies as long as the expected penalty pf is not less 
than the gain from noncompliance c _ b. Clearly, this is a necessary condition if a 
coalition of individuals who contribute to the public good is to form. Therefore, we will 
assume pf  (c – b) from here on. 
 
2.2.3 Agreement stage In this stage the coalition members agree to contribute to the 
public good and to fund the enforcer provided that these decisions maximize their joint 
payoffs. Each member’s contribution to the enforcer, x, is endogenous so we determine 
this value first. If a coalition of contributors is to form, each member would like to 
contribute as little as possible while providing the enforcer with sufficient resources to 
maintain compliance within the coalition. This requires a payment x so that pf  (c – b) 
binds. Since p = x(alpha) from (4), the contribution to the enforcer that is required of 
each coalition member is 
 
(6)     
 
Coalition members will fund the enforcer and jointly agree to contribute to the public 
good only if they will be at least as well off as without the coalition. Again, contributing to 
the public good must be profitable for the members of the coalition. Given a coalition of 
s members that each earn  - x = A + bs – c - x if they contribute to the public 
good, and a player’s payoff in the absence of a coalition, A, the minimum size profitable 
coalition is the smallest s such that A + bs – c – x  A. Substituting for x from (6) and 
rearranging terms yields . Thus, the minimum sized profitable 
coalition when members bear the cost of enforcing compliance within the coalition is 
 
(7)     
 
where the superscript c indicates that enforcing compliance is costly for the members. If 
s  sc players join a coalition in the first stage of the game (the membership stage), 
they will agree to contribute to the public good in the second stage (the agreement 
stage). Furthermore, each member pays x from (6) to the enforcer in this stage and will 
comply with the terms of the agreement in stage three (the contributions stage). On the 
other hand, if s < s^c from the first stage, the coalition members maximize their joint 
payoffs by deciding not to contribute to the public good and they do not fund the 
enforcer. Thus, if s < s^c in the membership stage a coalition of contributors to the 
public good does not form and the game concludes. 
 
2.2.4 Membership stage As in the coalition formation game without the need for costly 
enforcement, the equilibrium coalition size when member-financed enforcement is 
required is the smallest profitable coalition, sc defined by (7). In contrast to the game in 
which compliance is assured, profitable coalitions may not exist when enforcement is 
required. Profitable coalitions exist when enforcement is required if and only if n  sc , 
or using (7), n  c/b + (c – b) / b(alpha)f. While we have assumed that n > c/b, there is 
nothing in the model that guarantees n  c/b + (c – b) / b(alpha)f. Thus, a large benefit 
from noncompliance c _ b, low monitoring productivity _, or a low sanction f, can 
prevent a coalition from forming. However, if n  sc , then sc players will join a coalition 
in the first stage of the game. They will agree to contribute to the public good and fund 
the enforcer in the second. In the third stage they all contribute to the public good, while 
the non-members do not. In the fourth stage the enforcer randomly audits the decisions 
of the coalition members but finds no violations. This is the subgame perfect equilibrium 
of the coalition formation game when cooperation requires member-financed 
enforcement and enforcement costs do not prevent coalitions from forming. 
 
2.3 Enforcement costs and the size of stable coalitions 
 
When a coalition that requires member-financed enforcement forms, it is likely to have 
more members and provide more of the public good than when compliance within a 
coalition is enforced without cost. To see why, recall from (3) that the equilibrium 
coalition size when costly enforcement is not required, s^nc, is the least s for which s
c/b.  When a coalition requires costly enforcement and this requirement this does not 
prevent a coalition from forming, from (7) the equilibrium coalition size, s^c, is the least s 
for which s  c/b + (c – b) / b(alpha)f. Since (c – b) / b(alpha)f > 0, s^c  s^nc. The 
reason for this result is that funding the enforcer is an additional cost of joining a 
coalition to provide a public good; hence, a greater amount of the public good needs to 
be provided to make the coalition profitable. When each individual has one unit of the 
public good to contribute, this requires greater participation in the coalition. The 
experiments described in the next section were designed to test this hypothesis. 
 
3. Experimental design 
 
All of the experimental sessions were held in a computer lab at the University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst, using undergraduate and graduate students recruited from 
the general student population. In each session, 20 subjects were brought into the 
computer lab, seated and paid five dollars for arriving on time. The instructions were 
read aloud by the moderator. After answering a series of practice questions the subjects 
began the experiment. At the start of each period, the 20 subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of two 10-person groups such that the same 10 people were never 
together in the same group more than once. The random assignment of groups was 
done to mitigate potential problems of reputation that can occur when the same subjects 
interact in a repeated setting (Andreoni and Croson, 2002). Two 13-period sessions with 
two groups per session were conducted for each treatment, resulting in 52 group level 
observations (four groups_13 periods) and 520 individual level observations per 
treatment. Earnings were reported in experimental dollars, and 10 experimental dollars 
exchanged for one US dollar. Earnings were paid in cash at the end of each 
experiment. On average the subjects earned $23, ranging from $15 to $33 (omega = 
$4.33). 
 
To avoid potential biases subjects may have regarding the provision of public goods, 
and to generalize our results to other applications of stable coalitions, we chose a 
neutral frame for the context and language of the experiments. Specifically, rather than 
having subjects decide whether to join a coalition with the others to provide a public 
good, they chose either to agree to produce one unit of an unspecified product, or not 
agree to produce the unit. An agreement was said to ‘form’ if enough subjects agreed to 
produce such that the stated participation threshold was met. 
 
One of the unique features of our design is that while subjects were making their 
decisions, they were provided with real-time information about the decisions of the other 
nine subjects in the group.4 Specifically, they were informed about the number of other 
subjects that already agreed to produce, the number of other subjects that did not agree 
to produce and the number of other subjects that had not yet made a decision. The real-
time information feature was included for two reasons. First, the information was 
provided to minimize potential coordination problems that typically arise when decisions 
are made simultaneously.5 Second, it best represents the timing and information of 
participation decisions in real cooperative coalitions (e.g., international treaties) in which 
agents decide when, relative to others, to join or not join. To cap the length of each 
period, subjects had 60 seconds to make their decisions. If a subject failed to decide 
before the time was up, she chose not agree to produce by default. Subjects were not 




3.1 Costless enforcement-low 
 
Our first treatment is of the model from Section 2.1 in which compliance within a 
cooperative coalition is costless to enforce. For reasons that will become obvious 
shortly, we chose the individual cost of producing the good to be low (i.e., low c) and 
called this treatment ‘costless enforcement-low’. It provides a baseline to judge the 
effects of adding member-financed enforcement of compliance to the coalition formation 
game. 
 
In each period, the only decision a subject had to make was whether to agree to 
produce or not agree to produce the unit. Those who chose agree to produce did not 
have the opportunity to renege on this decision later. We chose parameter values of 
n=10, A=8, b=3, and c = 7 for eq. (1), and derived the theoretically stable coalition size 
of s^nc = 3 using eq. (3). Thus, the participation threshold for costless enforcement-low 
was set at three members. If at least three of the ten group members agreed to 
produce, then the agreement formed and those individuals that agreed to produce 
automatically produced the product and earned  using (2). If less than three 
group members agreed to produce, the entire group did not produce and each subject 
earned eight experimental dollars, . Those subjects that chose not agree to 
produce, did not produce the product regardless of whether a coalition formed and 
earned  according to (2). 
 
Table 1 Earnings table for costless enforcement-low 
 
 
Table 1 shows the matrix of payoff possibilities the subjects were given for each period 
of the experiment, the form of which is similar to that used by Rapoport and Eshed-Levy 
(1989). The boxes marked with an X indicate outcomes that are not possible because 
the participation threshold would not be met in these circumstances. To see why, note 
that the top row of the earnings table corresponds to the number of other subjects 
(ranging from 0 to 9) producing the good. However, production can only occur if at least 
three members of the group agree to produce. Therefore, under no circumstances could 
only one or two members of the group produce the good, hence the X’s. All elements of 
the earnings table were clearly explained to the subjects before the experiment began. 
 
3.2 Costly enforcement 
 
Our second treatment was designed to incorporate the elements of the model of 
member-financed enforcement of compliance within a stable coalition that we presented 
in Section 2.2. We called this treatment ‘costly enforcement’. Relative to the costless 
enforcement-low treatment, we added two stages to the costly enforcement treatment. 
Provided that enough subjects agreed to produce to meet the participation threshold, 
those who agreed to produce then had to decide whether to abide by this decision and 
actually produce. These compliance decisions were made simultaneously and without 
real-time feedback. After the coalition members made these decisions their choices 
were randomly audited and detected cases of noncompliance were sanctioned. 
 
The values of n, A, b, and c were set exactly as in the costless enforcement-low 
treatment. In addition, we chose an audit probability of p = 0.8 and a penalty for non-
compliance of f = 6 as the enforcement parameters applied to the members of a 
coalition. Note that the expected penalty for noncompliance was pf = 4.8. The subjects 
were told the audit probability and sanction at the beginning of each period, but they 
were not told the expected penalty. Because the benefit from noncompliance was c – b 
= 4.0, the expected penalty was more than sufficient to induce compliance by risk-
neutral agents. (Refer to the condition for compliance provided by eq. (5)). The cost of 
enforcing compliance with the agreement for each member of a coalition was set at x = 
8:08. (Using eq. (6), this implies a marginal productivity of resources devoted to 
monitoring of alpha = 0.619). We did not have members of a coalition actually pay x; 
rather it was implicit in the calculation of their earnings. 
 
Table 2 Earnings table for costly enforcement 
 
 
Using (7), the stable coalition size in this treatment is six members, so the subjects were 
told that the participation threshold for an agreement to form was six subjects. If less 
than six subjects agreed to produce, the entire group did not produce and each subject 
earned eight experimental dollars, n^nm (0) = 8.  If six or more subjects agreed to 
produce, individual earnings for each possible scenario in the costly enforcement 
treatment are provided in Table 2.6 The subjects were given this table at the start of 
each period of this treatment. The second row in the table shows the potential earnings 
for a coalition member that complies with the agreement by choosing to produce. The 
third and fourth rows show earnings for a noncompliant coalition member, one who 
agreed to produce then chose not to. The third row gives the earnings of the subject 
when it is audited while the earnings in the fourth row assume the subject was not 
audited. The difference in earnings between these two rows is simply the f = 6 penalty 
for noncompliance. The final row lists the potential earnings for a subject that does not 
join the coalition and, therefore, does not produce. 
 
3.3 Costless enforcement-high 
 
The third treatment is the same as the costless enforcement-low treatment except that 
the cost of production was increased to c = 15.08. This higher production cost is 
denoted as cH, and we refer to this treatment as costless enforcement-high. This higher 
cost parameter was chosen so that the increase in production cost between the costless 
enforcement-low treatment and the costless enforcement-high treatment is equivalent to 
the individual cost of enforcing compliance in the costly enforcement treatment; that is, 
. Because of the higher production cost, the stable coalition size for 
the costless enforcement-high treatment is six members, the same stable coalition size 
and participation threshold as for the costly enforcement treatment. Table 3 is the payoff 
table we provided each subject in this treatment. Note that it takes a similar form to the 
earnings table for the costless enforcement-low treatment, except that more outcomes 
are not possible (those marked by an X) because of the higher participation threshold. 
 
Table 3 Earnings table for costless enforcement-high 
 
 
Structuring the costless enforcement-high treatment so that the participation costs and 
the participation threshold are equivalent to that of the costly enforcement treatment 
allows us to isolate two effects of the compliance problem in stable coalitions. The first 
effect is the compliance decision itself while the second is the higher participation 
threshold that is associated with the additional costs of enforcing compliance within 
stable coalitions. Since the predicted participation levels are the same in the costless 
enforcement-high and the costly enforcement treatments, we can isolate the impact of 
the compliance decision on the performance of cooperative coalitions by comparing the 
results from these two treatments. Moreover, by comparing the results of the costless 
enforcement-high treatment with the costless enforcement-low treatment we can 
separate the effect of the higher participation cost and higher participation threshold 
from the compliance decision effect. 
 
3.4 Costly enforcement-full 
 
In this final treatment, we abandoned the internal and external stability conditions for 
determining the participation threshold and tested the performance of a coalition that 
requires member-financed enforcement, but also requires full participation. We call this 
treatment costly enforcement-full. For this treatment we maintained the same parameter 
choices as in the costly enforcement treatment, but we raised the participation threshold 
from six to ten subjects. As with the costly enforcement treatment, if the ten-subject 
threshold was satisfied, each member then had to decide whether to comply by 
producing the good. After these decisions, the coalition members were monitored and 
detected cases of noncompliance were sanctioned. The earnings table we provided the 
subjects in this treatment is the same as the one provided for the costly enforcement 





4.1 Group-level analysis 
 
Much of our analysis of the experimental data is based on the summary statistics 
contained in Table 5 and the regression results in Table 6. Table 5 contains the average 
provision of the public good, the percentage of times a coalition formed, the average 
number of members of coalitions, as well as the average compliance rates by members 
of coalitions under costly enforcement and costly enforcement-full. Drawing from our 
results in Section 2, our predictions for each 
 




Table 5 Coalition formation, compliance, and public good provision 
 
 
treatment are that coalitions form in every period, the number of coalition members and 
the provision of the public good equal the participation threshold, and that coalition 
members are always compliant under costly enforcement and costly enforcement-full. 
The results for three regressions are contained in Table 6. From left to right in the table, 
the dependent variables are the provision of the public good (ranging from zero to ten), 
whether a coalition forms (equaling one when a coalition forms and zero otherwise) and 
the number of members when coalitions form (ranging from three to ten). The first and 
last are linear regressions while the second is a logit regression. 
 
Table 6 Group-level regressions on public good provision, coalition formation, 
and coalition membership 
 
 
For each regression we included treatment dummies (the costless enforcement-low 
treatment dummy is suppressed for each regression), a session dummy (zero for the 
first session, one for the second) and two period dummies for the middle periods (5–9) 
and the later periods (10–13) which are interpreted relative to the beginning four 
periods. Recall that for each of the four treatments we generated 52 group-level 
observations over two sessions. The group composition was reshuffled at the beginning 
of each period in order to create 52 unique groups which are treated as independent 
observations in our regression (i.e., the same group does not make repeated decisions). 
We acknowledge that although each of the groups is technically different, individual 
subjects are making repeated decisions and repeatedly interacting with other subjects 
and therefore our assumption of independent observations is not trivial. That said, we 
purposely designed the experiment with the strangers feature so that subjects could 
play a series of one-shot games which is more consistent with the theoretical model in 
Section 2 compared to an environment in which subjects make repeated interactions 
within the same group. We examine the repeated nature of the decision making process 
through the dummy variables for periods and we include a session dummy in order to 
control for any possible session effect. 
 
Recall the main hypothesis from our theoretical model of Section 2: relative to stable 
coalitions that do not require enforcement, the possibility of noncompliance within stable 
coalitions in tandem with member-financed enforcement to maintain full compliance 
results in greater participation in coalitions and, consequently, higher provision of the 
public good. This hypothesis is clearly rejected by our experimental data. Although the 
average number of members when coalitions formed was significantly higher under 
costly enforcement than under costless enforcement- low , the 
average provision of the public good was significantly less under costly enforcement 
. The drop in contributions to the public good is due to the 
significant decrease in the likelihood of a coalition forming under costly enforcement 
, and the significant percentage of noncompliance under this 
treatment (31.6% noncompliance). 
 
The results from Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the subjects in the costly enforcement 
treatment did not come close to meeting theoretical expectations. Although when 
coalitions formed there were more members on average than the six predicted
, there was a substantial amount of noncompliance in 
these coalitions.8 Moreover, coalitions formed only 53.8% of the time. The high rates of 
noncompliance and the low frequency of coalition formation produced an average 
provision of the public good in this treatment of only 3.09 units , which is 
significantly below the six units predicted (p<0.01). 
 
Recall that we conducted the costless enforcement-high experiment to separate the 
effect of a higher participation cost and higher participation threshold for coalitions that 
require member-financed enforcement from the effect of giving coalition members the 
opportunity to violate cooperative agreements. Thus, we can explain the poor 
performance of the costly enforcement treatment by examining the relative importance 
of these effects.  
 
When coalitions formed under costless enforcement-high, the average number of group 
members was not statistically different from the theoretical prediction of six 
. However, coalitions formed less frequently under this 
treatment than predicted and in comparison with the costless enforcement-low 
treatment . This result is consistent with several other threshold 
public goods studies that found that raising the participation threshold reduced the 
percentage of trials in which a public good is provided (Van de Kragt et al., 1983; 
Dawes et al., 1986; Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992; Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993; 
Cadsby and Maynes, 1999). Because coalitions formed less frequently under costless 
enforcement-high, the average provision of the public good was significantly less than 
the predicted six units  and statistically indistinguishable 
from the average provision of the good under the costless enforcement-low treatment 
. Thus the higher participation cost and participation threshold 
had no effect on the average provision of the public good. 
 
Now let us compare the outcomes of costless enforcement-high to costly enforcement. 
Coalitions were equally likely to form under these two treatments . 
Although coalitions tended to have more members under costly enforcement than under 
costless enforcement-high  p = 0.03), non-compliance under costly 
enforcement more than offset this higher membership so that the average provision of 
the public good was significantly higher under costless enforcement-high , 
p<0.01). Thus, holding the participation costs and threshold constant, giving coalition 
members the opportunity to be noncompliant, but randomly auditing and fining them to 
maintain compliance, had a significant negative effect on the cooperative provision of 
the public good. 
 
We are now ready to specify the relative impacts of the higher participation cost and 
threshold effect and the compliance decision effect on the significant underprovision of 
the public good under costly enforcement. Average provision of the public good under 
this treatment is 2.91 units below the prediction of 6 units. The higher participation cost 
and threshold component of these 2.91 units is the difference between the predicted six 
units and average provision under costless enforcement-high , that is, 
1.57 units (about 54% of the total effect). The compliance decision component is the 
remaining 1.34 units (about 46%). Thus, the poor performance of the costly 
enforcement treatment relative to its theoretical prediction is explained (nearly equally) 
by both the higher participation cost and threshold effect and the compliance decision 
effect. 
 
However, relative to the provision of the public good under costless enforcement-low, 
nearly all of the underprovision of the good under costly enforcement is due to the 
compliance effect. Average provision of the public good under costly enforcement is 
1.63 units below average provision under costless enforcement-low. The higher 
participation cost and threshold component of this is the difference between the average 
provision of the good under costless enforcement-low and average provision under 
costless enforcement-high, that is, only 0.29 units. We have already noted that this 
difference is not statistically different from zero  
 
 
Fig. 1 Average coalition membership and average provision of the public good  
 
(p = 0.55). However, the compliance decision effect is the remaining 1.34 units, which is 
highly significant . 
 
Groups under the costly enforcement-full treatment fared much better than under the 
costly enforcement treatment. Recall that costly enforcement-full is the same as costly 
enforcement, except that instead of setting the participation threshold at the theoretically 
stable coalition size, we required full participation for a coalition to form. Although the 
average compliance rate within coalitions under costly enforcement-full was similar to 
that under costly enforcement (71.3% vs 68.4% from Table 5), coalitions were more 
likely to form under costly enforcement-full . Consequently, the 
average provision of the public good was significantly higher under costly enforcement-
full than under costly enforcement . 
 
To complete this section, we discuss how the results change over the 13 periods of the 
experiments. Figure 1 shows the time series of average coalition membership and 
average public good provision over the 13 periods in each treatment. The dark 
horizontal lines indicate the participation threshold for each treatment. Note that 
coalition membership is stable over periods for each treatment. This is supported by the 
insignificant coefficients (at the 0.05 level) for the middle and ending period dummy 
variables from the third regression in Table 6. We do, however, note a drop in the 
likelihood of coalitions forming and the average provision of the public good over the 
duration of the experiments indicated by the two significant coefficients on the period 
dummies in the first regression in Table 6 and the significant coefficient on the last 
periods in the second regression. 
 




4.2 Individual-level analysis 
 
Players’ average earnings by treatment and decision are reported in Table 7. We report 
the average expected earnings of noncompliant coalition members (gross earnings 
minus the 4.8 expected penalty) under these treatments.10 The low provision of the 
public good under the costly enforcement experiments is reflected in the subjects’ 
earnings. Recall that our model from Section 2 predicts that members (non-members) 
under costly enforcement, on average, will earn higher payoffs than members (non-
members) under costless enforcement-low. In contrast to this prediction we find that, on 
average, those who joined a coalition (i.e., agreed to produce) under costless 
enforcement-low were better off than those who joined a coalition under costly 
enforcement regardless of whether the coalition members actually complied with the 
agreement (14.73 vs 7.67, p<0.001 for compliant coalition members and 14.73 vs 7.86, 
p<0.001 for noncompliant members).  Compliant coalition members and noncompliant 
coalition members earned about the same under the costly enforcement treatment (7.67 
vs 7.86, p = 0.81), and there is no statistical difference (at the 0.05 level) between these 
earnings for coalition members and the eight experimental dollars each would have 
earned had  
 
Table 8 Subject-level regressions on joining and complying with coalitions 
 
 
no coalition formed in the first place (p = 0.54 for compliant members and p = 0.83 for 
noncompliant members). On the other hand, when requiring full participation of the 
group members for a coalition to form (i.e., costly enforcement-full), the average payoffs 
for coalition members were significantly larger than under costly enforcement, 
regardless of whether members complied (15.46 vs 7.67, p<0.01, and 13.93 vs 7.86, 
p<0.01). 
 
To conclude this section we analyse the individual-level decisions driving the 
overarching group-level results. For the first column of regression results in Table 8 the 
dependent variable is the binary decision whether to join a coalition and in the second 
column the dependent variable is the binary decision whether to comply conditioned on 
joining a coalition. Both are logit regressions. We include dummy variables for the 
treatments (costless enforcement-low is dropped in the first column and costly 
enforcement is dropped in the second), session and periods and a subject-specific 
random-effects specification of the error term , where  captures 
random effects and "it is the contemporaneous error term. This specification was 
chosen in order to control for potentially strong individual effects that can occur when 
the same subject makes multiple decisions within a treatment. Consistent with our 
group-level findings, subjects are more likely to join a coalition when the threshold is 
increased ( > 0 at the 0.05 level). In support of the theory, subjects are equally 
likely to join a coalition between costly enforcement and costless enforcement-high in 
which the threshold is set at six members for both treatments  P = 
0.82). We also see a decrease in the likelihood of a subject joining a coalition in the last 
periods which is consistent with our finding that coalitions formed less frequently in later 
periods. Finally, in reference to the results from the second regression in Table 8, 
subjects are equally likely to comply between the two treatments with member-financed 
enforcement and compliance decisions do not change significantly 
over the periods . 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
We have examined the compliance and enforcement problem in cooperative coalitions 
to provide a public good. The notion of coalitional stability that we use—that of internal 
and external stability—has been used in many theoretical contexts including 
examinations of cartels, international environmental agreements, and voluntary pollution 
control agreements between sources of pollution and regulators. In most of these 
applications, however, the rather obvious point that even cooperative arrangements 
must be enforced has been ignored. We have presented a theoretical model in which 
members of a coalition to provide a public good finance enforcement of commitments by 
coalition members. Our main result of this theoretical exercise is that when stable 
coalitions that require member-financed enforcement form they will have greater 
participation levels. Consequently, provision of the public good should be higher. The 
intuition is simple: participation in stable coalitions is higher because the added cost of 
enforcement must be offset by an increase in public good provision to make a 
cooperative coalition worthwhile. 
 
Our laboratory test of this hypothesis is definitive—the hypothesis is flatly rejected. In 
experiments with member-financed enforcement when the participation threshold was 
set at the theoretically stable coalition size, public good provision was well below the 
theoretical prediction. Moreover, public good provision was below the levels obtained in 
a treatment that featured a participation threshold that was set at the stable coalition 
size, but that did not require enforcement. The lower public good provision occurred 
because coalitions that require enforcement formed much less frequently, and when 
they did form there was a significant amount of noncompliance within the coalition, even 
though the expected penalty was chosen to be greater than the gain from 
noncompliance. 
 
Relative to stable coalitions that do not require enforcement, two things change when 
coalition members finance enforcement to counteract the incentive each of them has to 
violate their commitments. The first is the compliance decision itself and the second is 
the theoretical outcome that the higher participation cost leads to a higher participation 
threshold if coalitions with member-financed enforcement are to form. Our experimental 
design allows us to determine that both the compliance decision effect and the higher 
participation cost and threshold effect contributed to the poor performance of a 
theoretically stable coalition with member-financed enforcement. 
 
That both of these components have significant negative impacts are puzzles that 
require further work to fully understand. Like us, other authors have found that 
increasing the participation threshold for a contract to provide a public good reduces the 
frequency of coalition formation and reduces the provision of a public good, but why this 
occurs is an open question. One possible explanation for this in our experiments is that 
increasing the participation threshold increases the free-riding payoffs of those who stay 
out of coalitions. The increased motivation to stay out of stable coalitions and perhaps a 
motivation to keep individuals from reaping the free-riding benefit may help explain why 
coalitions form less frequently with higher participation thresholds. This explanation is 
consistent with our finding that requiring full participation for coalitions to form 
significantly increased the provision of the public good, because requiring full 
participation eliminates the possibility of free riding by refusing to join a coalition. 
 
The other puzzle is why there was so much noncompliance in coalitions that required 
enforcement, even though the expected penalty was chosen to be greater than the gain 
from noncompliance regardless of the size of the coalition. It is reasonable to expect, 
however, that more compliance can be induced with more stringent enforcement. 
Determining whether this should be done with more stringent monitoring or a higher 
penalty requires a more complete experimental analysis of the effects of monitoring and 
penalties on coalition formation and their performance. We should note that even if 
more stringent enforcement can improve the performance of theoretically stable 
coalitions with member-financed enforcement, our results suggest that it will not 
overcome the negative impact of the higher participation cost and threshold effect. 
 
Despite these puzzles, our results suggest important lessons for the determination of 
threshold rules for coalition formation and for enforcing compliance within coalitions. 
Although theoretically stable coalitions with member-financed enforcement did not 
perform well, our results, in general, highlight the need for adequate enforcement of 
voluntary commitments. Further, the results illustrate the importance of jointly 
considering enforcement mechanisms and participation requirements when considering 
cooperative coalitions. Improving coalition formation and compliance within coalitions 
may require higher participation thresholds, perhaps even full participation, and more 
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